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Alamance County Hospital v. Neighbors: North Carolina
Rejects Child Support Provisions as a Limit on
the Doctrine of Necessaries
Under the English common law, no civilly enforceable law obligated parents to support their children.1 As the common law developed in the United
States, however, a father became primarily liable for the support of his minor
children under the doctrine of necessaries. 2 This doctrine imposes liability on a
father to a third party who has provided a child with necessaries that the father
has refused or failed to provide. 3 At least one jurisdiction also requires that the
parent have knowledge that the third party is providing necessary goods or serv4
ices to be liable under the doctrine.
Today, state statutes require a noncustodial parent to fulfill any obligation
to provide necessaries through child support payments. 5 Many jurisdictions,
however, still impose common-law liability to a third party even though the
parents are divorced and the parent being sued does not have custody of the
child.6 These jurisdictions have taken the view that parents have a common-law
duty to support their children that is independent of any statutory requirements
for child support provisions in a divorce decree. 7 In contrast, the remaining
jurisdictions have taken the view that the child support which the noncustodial
I. J. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 383 (1931). Although a father could be
criminally liable for neglecting the maintenance of his child, there was no civil liability. Id. "[Tihe
law [did] not, as in the case of husband and wife, create any liability on the part of a parent for
necessaries furnished his child, in the absence of [a] contract in fact, express or implied, on his part."

Id. at 384.
2. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 6.3, at 189-90 (1968). If the father fails to
provide necessaries, the mother or child may purchase them on the husband's credit. The father is
then liable to the supplier. Id. at 190. "At common law the husband was primarily liable for the
support of his minor children.... Upon his failure or neglect to furnish necessaries for the support
of his children according to his station in life, one who has done so may recover from the father
accordingly." 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.59, at 360-61 (2d ed. 1961).
3. See, e.g., Watkins v. Medical & Dental Finance Bureau, 101 Ariz. 580, 422 P.2d 696 (1967)
(en bane), in which the court stated:
The "implied promise for necessaries" doctrine was not formulated for the purpose of
aiding enterprising third parties, but rather is a policy law meant to impel neglectful parents to assume responsibility for their child's welfare. Parents who are not guilty of neglect, in turn, are not to be denied the valuable right to choose with whom they shall deal.
Id. at 582, 422 P.2d at 698.
4. Thompson v. Perr, 238 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that a dentist could not
recover from a father paying child support because the father had no knowledge that the dentist had
rendered services to the child). But see Lawrence v. Cox, 464 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that a dentist could recover from a father paying child support even though the father had
no knowledge that the services were rendered).
5. See generally Wallop, The Last Campaign-ChildSupport and Poverty, 1983 DET. C.L.
REV. 1467 (discussing the relationship between the poverty problem in the United States and the
problem of collecting child support payments); Note, Child Support: His, Her,or TheirResponsibility?, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 707 (1976) (discussing the factors to be considered when the court determines the amount of child support); Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw, 1981, Family
Law, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1379, 1394-96 (1982) (discussing cases addressing issues of court-ordered child
support).
6. J. MADDEN, supra note 1, at 388.
7. J. MADDEN, supra note 1, at 388-89.
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parent is obligated to pay under the divorce decree constitutes the absolute limit
of his or her liability. 8 Because these jurisdictions limit liability to the terms of
the divorce decree, subject to the power of the court to modify the decree, they
do not allow a cause of action for necessaries by a third party against a noncustodial parent.9
In Alamance County Hospitalv. Neighbors,l ° a case of first impression in
North Carolina, the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the view that the
common-law remedy under the doctrine of necessaries exists in addition to
whatever provisions for child support the divorce decree may contain."1 This
Note examines the court's application of related North Carolina cases and considers cases from other jurisdictions. The Note concludes that although the definition of a legal necessary will require refinement in the future, the supreme
court adopted the better view.
The third party suing for compensation in Alamance County Hospitalwas a
hospital that had rendered nonemergency medical services to defendants' minor
13
daughter. 12 Defendants had divorced prior to their daughter's hospitalization.
During the divorce proceedings, the court granted custody of the child to the
mother and ordered the father to pay $26.50 per week for the support and maintenance of the child. 14 All support payments were current when the hospital
5
brought suit against both parents jointly and severally.'
When the mother admitted the child to the hospital, she signed the hospital
admission forms. Later, she signed two promissory notes for the payment of the
hospital bill. 16 The record contained no evidence that the father signed anything
or even knew of his daughter's illness and admission to the hospital. 17 The hospital's theory of recovery against the father was not, however, based on contract. 18 It more closely resembled a claim for restitution from the father under
the common-law doctrine of necessaries. 19 The father filed a motion to dismiss
8. Annotation, Support ProvisionsofJudicialDecree or Orderas Limit of Father'sLiabilityfor
Expenses of Child, 7 A.L.R.2d 491, 492-97 (1949). On request by the custodial parent, the divorce
decree may be subsequently modified by a court to increase the amount for child support if changed
circumstances warrant such a modification. Id. at 492, 494.
9. Id. at 492. In these jurisdictions, "a judicial support provision is the absolute limit of the

father's liability except as it may be subsequently modified. Sometimes the decree or order is considered as replacing the father's common-law liability with a statutory one, and sometimes as defining
or limiting it." Id.
10. 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).
11. Id. at 368-70, 338 S.E.2d at 91-92.
12. Id. at 364, 338 S.E.2d at 88.
13. Id. at 363, 338 S.E.2d at 88.
14. Id.
15. Id. The amount for support was later increased to $35 per week in 1976; support was
lowered to $30 per week in a 1978 criminal support order. Id.
16. Id. at 364, 338 S.E.2d at 88.
17. Id. The opinion suggests that the medical care provided for defendants' daughter was not
emergency care. Id. at 368 n.2, 338 S.E.2d at 90 n.2.
18. Id. at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 90-91.
19. Id. at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 90. The hospital's complaint alleged that the services it provided
were necessary and reasonable, and that both the mother and father had refused to pay for them. Id.
at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 91. The hospital failed to cite any authority, however, that supported its own
right to collect from the father in the absence of a contract. Id. at 368 n.2, 338 S.E.2d at 90 n.2.

1310

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and a motion to
drop his name as a party to the action on the grounds that, because he was
paying child support, the hospital had no direct action against him. 20 The trial
court entered an order granting the father's motion to dismiss and the hospital
21
appealed.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order on the
ground that there was no contract between the father and the hospital. 2 2 The
court of appeals cited no authority for its holding, and did not address the doctrine of necessaries. It simply held that, absent a contract, a noncustodial parent
is not liable to a third party provider of nonemergency care for a minor child.23
The hospital appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which reversed the
decision and held that the right of a third party provider of goods or services to
recover against the noncustodial parent continues, despite the divorce,
"unimpaired by contracts or judicial decrees or orders affecting the relations
between the parents." 24
In reviewing the court of appeals' decision, the supreme court noted that
the father's defense that a noncustodial parent's liability is limited to the amount
of child support in the divorce decree raised an issue of first impression in North
Carolina. 25 The court also noted that North Carolina cases recognized a third
party provider's right to recover from a noncustodial parent, 26 but that these
cases did not involve the situation in which the noncustodial parent is making
child support payments as ordered in a divorce decree. 27 The court examined
North Carolina statutory law concerning child support and concluded that the
1981 amendment to North Carolina General Statutes section 50-13.4(b), 28
which made both parents primarily liable for the support of their children, did
not lessen a father's duty to support his minor children. 29 Therefore, this statute
did not prevent the court from finding liability to the third party provider. The
20. Id. at 364, 338 S.E.2d at 88.
21. Id. at 364, 338 S.E.2d at 89.
22. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 68 N.C. App. 771, 773, 315 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1984),
rey'd, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986). "While parents are ordinarily liable for the support,
maintenance, and care of their minor children, a non-custodial parent is not liable to a third-party
provider of nonemergency care for a minor child absent some contractual relationship ..
Id.
23. Id.
24. Alamance County Hosp., 315 N.C. at 369, 338 S.E.2d at 92.
25. Id. at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 91.
26. Id. at 367, 338 S.E.2d at 90. The cases cited were Bitting v. Goss, 203 N.C. 424, 166 S.E.
302 (1932); Howell v. Solomon, 167 N.C. 588, 83 S.E. 609 (1914); and P.J. Hunycutt & Co. v.
Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (1912).
27. Alamance County Hosp., 315 N.C. at 367, 338 S.E.2d at 90.
28. Act of June 18, 1981, ch. 613, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 872 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.4(b) (1984)).
29. Alamance County Hosp., 315 N.C. at 366, 338 S.E.2d at 90. Before 1981, this statute made
the father's responsibility for support of his children primary and the mother's secondary. In re
Register, 303 N.C. 149, 154, 277 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in Plott v.
Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 67-68, 326 S.E.2d 863, 866-67 (1985). The statute was amended in 1981 to make
both parents primarily liable. Act of June 18, 1981, ch. 613, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 892 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1984)). The 1981 amendment, however, did not
diminish the father's responsibility, but instead made both parents primarily liable for the support of
their children. See Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 67-68, 326 S.E.2d 863, 866-67 (1985).
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court also concluded that North Carolina still follows the common-law doctrine
30
of necessaries.

The court then looked to cases from other jurisdictions to help it decide
whether to allow a cause of action by the hospital or to limit the noncustodial
parent's liability to the amount of child support in the divorce decree. 3 1 The
court identified several states that limit liability to the child support obligation in
a divorce decree, but failed to examine any cases from those states.32 The court
did cite cases from jurisdictions that have allowed liability to a third party provider,33 but discussed only one of these cases, Barrett v. Barrett,34 a 1934 Arizona case. Relying on Barrett, the court stated that a child's right to support
35
from both parents is unimpaired by support provisions in a divorce decree.
The court expanded this principle to include the right of third party providers of

necessaries to claim compensation from both parents, not just the custodial parent. 36 The supreme court then reversed the court of appeals' decision and held

that, because a noncustodial parent's liability for the support of his or her minor
children is not necessarily limited to the amount of child support in a divorce
37
decree, the hospital had stated a cause of action against the father.

Prior to the 1981 amendment to section 50-13.4(b), only the father was
primarily liable for the support of his minor children. 38 North Carolina child
support law now provides that both the mother and the father are primarily
liable.3 9 The amended statute, however, does not diminish the father's obliga-

tion. 4° He cannot contract away or transfer to another his responsibility to support his children. 41 His obligation to provide support survives divorce even if
the mother is awarded custody of the children.4 2

30. Alamance County Hosp., 315 N.C. at 367, 338 S.E.2d at 90.
31. Id. at 368-69, 338 S.E.2d at 91.
32. Id. at 368, 338 S.E.2d at 91. States limiting a noncustodial parent's liability to judicially
decreed child support include Arkansas, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York,
Ohio, and Oregon. Id.
33. Id. at 369, 338 S.E.2d at 91; see Graham v. Graham, 38 Colo. 453, 457, 88 P. 852, 853
(1906) (father is still liable for necessary expenses for the support of his minor children even though
he does not have custody; the rights of the children are not affected by the divorce decree because
they are not parties to the divorce action); Thompson v. Perr, 238 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. Ct. App.
1951) (court would have allowed recovery if the third-party provider, a dentist, could have shown
that the noncustodial parent had knowledge of his services); Rose Funeral Home v. Julian, 176
Tenn. 534, 537-38, 144 S.W.2d 755, 756 (1940) (court allowed recovery to the third party on the
grounds that a divorce decree providing for child support payments relates merely to rights between
the father and mother and does not affect the rights of the child).
34. 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934).
35. Alamance County Hosp., 315 N.C. at 369, 338 S.E.2d at 91.
36. Id. at 369, 338 S.E.2d at 92.
37. Id. at 369-70, 338 S.E.2d at 91-92.
38. In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 154, 277 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1981), superseded by statute as
stated in Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 67-68, 326 S.E.2d 863, 866-67 (1985).
39. See supra note 29; Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 67-68, 326 S.E.2d 863, 866-67 (1985).
40. Plott, 313 N.C. at 67-68, 326 S.E.2d at 866-67.
41. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 452-53, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945) (wife not allowed to
enforce contract made with deceased husband because the contract gave away property rightfully
belonging to his children).
42. Becker v. Becker, 273 N.C. 65, 70, 159 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1968); Story v. Story, 221 N.C.
114, 116, 19 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1942).
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No North Carolina case since 1981 has dealt with a parent's liability to a
third party provider of necessaries. The few North Carolina cases that have
involved this common-law liability were decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the early 1900s, when only the father was primarily liable for the support of his children. The court held in those cases that a third party provider of
necessaries does have a cause of action against the noncustodial parent.4 3 Recovery was allowed only under certain circumstances, however. If the noncustodial parent had neither refused nor neglected to provide support, but had at all
times been ready, willing, and able to fulfill his support obligation, then no recovery was allowed. 44
Three early North Carolina cases addressed the liability of a noncustodial
parent to a third party provider. In P.J Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson 45 a third
party who had furnished funeral services for a deceased minor child sued the
child's father for compensation. 4 6 The father had refused to support his son
while the son was in his custody and as a consequence had wrongfully driven
him away from home. 47 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that, because
the father had failed to provide for his son, the father was liable for the son's
funeral expenses. 4 8 If, however, the son had left home without fault on the father's part, the third party provider could not have recovered. 49
In Howell v. Solomon 50 a minor child's grandmother brought suit against
the child's father to recover compensation for the support and maintenance of
his two children. 51 The grandmother had taken custody of the children when
their mother died and had prevented the father from having any access to them
or providing support for them. 52 The court recognized that such a cause of
action by a third party provider is valid in North Carolina. 53 The court refused
to allow recovery, however, because the father was at all times ready and willing
54
to provide support.
The facts in another early North Carolina case, Bittin v. Goss,5 5 did not
involve a traditional third party provider suit against the noncustodial parent.
The case, however, does provide another example of North Carolina's accept43. Bitting v. Goss, 203 N.C. 424, 166 S.E. 302 (1932); Howell v. Solomon, 167 N.C. 588, 83
S.E. 609 (1914); P.J. Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (1912). One commentator has suggested that North Carolina still follows this view. 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 230, at 148 (4th ed. 1981).
44. See Howell v. Solomon, 167 N.C. 588, 593, 83 S.E. 609, 612 (1914); P.J. Hunycutt & Co. v.
Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 30-31, 74 S.E. 628, 629 (1912); 3 R. LEE, supra note 43, § 230, at 148.
45. 159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (1912).
46. Id. at 30, 74 S.E. at 628.
47. Id. at 30-31, 74 S.E. at 629.
48. Id. at 33, 74 S.E. at 630.
49. Id. at 30-31, 74 S.E. at 629.
50. 167 N.C. 588, 83 S.E. 609 (1914).
51. Id. at 589, 83 S.E. at 610.
52. Id. at 590, 83 S.E. at 610. The court did not fully relate the facts of the grandmother's
interference. It simply stated that "her infirmity of disposition" and "her intolerance, [sic] quarrelsome disposition" drove the father away. Id. at 593, 83 S.E. at 612.
53. Id. at 592, 83 S.E. at 612.
54. Id. at 593, 83 S.E. at 612.
55. 203 N.C. 424, 166 S.E. 302 (1932).
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ance of the principle that a third party provider can sue for compensation. The
issue was whether an infant living with his father could be liable to a doctor who
had rendered emergency medical care to the infant.5 6 The infant had recovered
damages from another party for the injuries requiring the medical care. 57 The
court held the infant was liable to the doctor, but also stated, "It goes without
saying that the father was liable to plaintiff the physician for the services ren58
dered his infant son."
Although recognizing that a cause of action may exist against a noncustodial parent, none of these early North Carolina cases dealt with a situation in
which a divorce decree provided that the noncustodial parent make child support payments to the custodial parent. Other jurisdictions have addressed this
issue, and though some allow liability, others do not. Barrett, on which the
supreme court relied, propounds the view that the noncustodial parent should be
liable to a third party provider of necessaries regardless of whether the court has
ordered child support payments to the custodial parent in the divorce decree.
The court in Barrett awarded custody of the children to the mother and ordered
the father to pay one thousand dollars and certain items of personal property in
lieu of any further provisions for child support. 59 When the mother became ill
and unable to provide for her children, one of the brothers furnished fifty dollars
per month for the support of the other children. The father knew that his son
was providing support for his children. 60 The son sued the father for the
61
amount of money the son had given his mother to support the other children.
The court stated that a divorce decree providing for child support is binding
between the mother and father, "but neither the statute nor the decree thereunder is the full measure of the duty of the parent to his minor children. If it were,
the children's right to support could not be enforced for lack of a remedy, provided the parent failed to act."' 62 The court also stated that although liability
could not be based on a contract theory, it could be found under the doctrine of
63
necessaries.
Some jurisdictions completely bar recovery by a third party provider
against a noncustodial parent when that parent is paying child support pursuant
56. Id. at 427, 166 S.E. at 303.
57. Id. The father had also recovered expenses incurred as a result of the child's accident,
including medical and hospital expenses. Id.
58. Id.
59. Barrett, 44 Ariz. at 511, 39 P.2d at 621. The court also absolved the father of any duty to
support his children. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 516, 39 P.2d at 623. Rose Funeral Home v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 144 S.W.2d 755
(1940), is another case holding a noncustodial father liable on the theory that the child's rights
against his parents survive divorce:
Where the divorce decree awarding the custody of the child to the mother provides that the
father shall contribute to its maintenance, it is logically held that such a decree relates
merely to the relative rights and duties of the parents toward each other. Since the child is
not a party to such suit, the child's rights as against the father are not affected.
Id. at 537-38, 144 S.W.2d at 756.
63. Barrett, 44 Ariz. at 519, 39 P.2d at 624.
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to a divorce decree.6 Some jurisdictions justify refusal to allow such a cause of
action on these grounds:
When the custody of a minor child is granted to the mother on divorce
from the father, and the father is ordered to contribute to the mother
for the support of the child, his common-law obligation to support the
child ceases
and the obligation under the decree is substituted
65
therefor.

Under this view, the terms of the divorce decree limit the noncustodial parent's
legal liability for the support of his or her children. 66 Another reason courts
have given for denying the cause of action is that the parent being sued has been
deprived of custody of the child. 67 "The exoneration from the common law
obligation to support the child when custody is decreed to the mother is based
upon the fact that the decree of custody to the mother deprives the father of his
title to the services and earnings of the child."'68 At least one court denied a
cause of action for another reason-the uncertainty that would result if one parent could incur debt and the creditors could recover directly from the other
parent. 69 Instead of requesting a court to modify the divorce decree, the custodial parent would "assume the power to modify the decree merely by purchasing
70
necessaries on credit."
The court in Alamance County Hospitalindicated it was applying the com71
mon-law doctrine of necessaries adopted in P.J.Hunycutt & Co. and Howell.
These cases stated that a third party provider has a right to sue a noncustodial
parent for compensation. The court adopted from Barrett the conclusion that
the child's right to support from both parents survives divorce and is not limited
by statute or a divorce decree under a statute.72 It is only fair to the child that
he or she be able to rely on both parents for food, clothing, medical care, education, and other necessaries regardless of the fact that the parents are bound to
divorce provisions between themselves. The large number of divorced mothers
living in poverty 73 demonstrates that the mother, who usually is the custodial
64. See, ag., Mahaney v. Crocker, 149 Me. 76, 98 A.2d 728 (1953); Ryder v. Perkins, 219

Mass. 525, 107 N.E. 387 (1914); Coastal Adjustment Bureau v. Wehner, 246 Or. 115, 423 P.2d 967
(1967).
65. Mahaney v. Crocker, 149 Me. 76, 78, 98 A.2d 728, 729 (1953). "Until modified by the
court,... the amount which the father is ordered to pay in such [a] decree measures his duty to
support the child." Id.
66. Ryder v. Perkins, 219 Mass. 525, 527, 107 N.E. 387, 388 (1914).
67. Mahaney, 149 Me. at 78, 98 A.2d at 729.
68. Id. at 78, 98 A.2d at 729.
69. Coastal Adjustment Bureau v. Wehner, 246 Or. 115, 117, 423 P.2d 967, 968 (1967).

70. Id.
71. Alamance County Hosp., 315 N.C. at 367, 338 S.E.2d at 90.

72. Id. at 369, 338 S.E.2d at 91-92.
73. M. TAKAS, CHILD SUPPORT xi (1985). Professor Takas has noted:
Today millions of families are headed by single mothers, and most experience the frustration of limited family income and lack of reliable child support. In fact, among femaleheaded families with children in the home, nearly two-thirds receive no child support at
all, and about one-third actually live below the poverty level.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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parent, 74 often will be unable to provide all necessaries from the father's child
support payments. 7" In addition, children frequently need unexpected medical
or dental care. Such expenses rarely can be anticipated when the court is determining the amount of support the noncustodial parent should pay. It also seems
appropriate to prevent the father, who was a party to bringing the child into the
for these exigencies merely because
world, from avoiding financial responsibility
76
he is current in his support payments.
It is important to understand that the decision in Alamance County Hospital still requires that, for the third party provider to recover from the noncustodial parent paying child support, it must establish that, first, "the services or
goods provided were legal necessaries" and, second, "the parent against whom
relief is sought has failed or refused to provide" the legal necessaries. 77 Thus,
the child support payments already made will be taken into account in determining "whether the parent has in fact met the obligation" to provide necessaries for
the child. 7 8 The noncustodial parent can defend on the basis that the goods and
services provided were not necessary. The noncustodial parent also can try to
show that the child support payments were in fact sufficient to provide for the
necessaries of the minor child. Furthermore, the court did not address "the
question of responsibility of [the] parents as between themselves" for the cost of
necessaries. 79 Therefore, the custodial parent, who usually will incur the expense, will often be liable for a share of the cost of that necessary. Liability
between the parents would depend on their relative economic circumstances, the
amount contributed by both parents, and what the custodial parent did with the
child support payments from the noncustodial parent. Thus, there are built-in
disincentives to the custodial parent to incur frivolous expenses. Should the
goods or services provided prove not to be necessaries, the custodial parent will
be fully liable to the third party provider for the expense, Even if the goods or
services are necessaries, the custodial parent may be liable to the noncustodial
parent for part or all of the expense.
There are practical arguments that support the view that liability should be
74. L. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 222 (1985). "On the average, mothers have
been awarded custody in close to 85 percent of the divorce cases in which children were involved.
Fathers were typically awarded custody in about 10 percent of the cases while the remaining awards
were to relatives, and/or for shared custody." Id.
75. Also, noncustodial fathers often fail to make support payments. Id. at 262. Professor
Weitzman has noted:
Despite court orders, noncustodial fathers fail to pay $4 billion in child support each year.
More than half (53 percent) of the millions of women who are due child support do not
receive the court-ordered support. Child support awards that go unpaid and unenforced
make a mockery of the judicial system and the value of court orders. They also leave
millions of children without the basic necessities of life.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
76. Although divorced mothers may live in poverty, divorced fathers without custody may live
in relative comfort even though they are making child support payments. M. TAKAS, supra note 73,
at xi. "One study shows that although the standard of living of women and children drops by an
average 73 percent after a divorce, men's standards of living actually increase by an average 42
percent." Id.

77. Alamance County Hasp., 315 N.C. at 370, 338 S.E.2d at 92.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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limited to the amount of child support in the divorce decree. Allowing one parent to incur the other parent's debt could result in never-ending litigation and
constant squabbles over which expenses were actually necessary. 80 Considering
the broad range of goods and services that could be classified as "necessaries," 8 1
the noncustodial parent could be subject to unlimited liability. The custodial
parent also needs clear guidelines on which expenses are legal necessaries.
Otherwise, a relatively poor custodial parent incurring an expense on behalf of
the minor child might be surprised to be fully liable for the cost of something
deemed not to be a necessary. The holding in Alamance County Hospitalis not
limited to medical services and, therefore, fails to provide guidelines that could
be used to limit the number of such suits. North Carolina courts should provide
these guidelines so that the support obligation in excess of judicially decreed
child support payments will be delineated clearly.
Another argument against allowing recovery from a parent making child
support payments is that the court's holding primarily protects third party creditors and is unnecessary to protect the rights of the minor children. 82 The holding protects creditors by guaranteeing that, if the custodial parent does not pay,
the noncustodial parent will be responsible for paying the debt. Arguably, the
court's holding is not necessary to protect the child's right to support because a
custodial parent can always request that the court modify the amount of support
provided in the divorce decree. Increase in child support through modification
allows for unanticipated expenses not included in the original support order.
Third parties may be unwilling to provide necessaries, however, without the
guarantee that both parents will be liable for the expenses. Furthermore, the
needs of the child may become desperate before the custodial parent can procure
a modification.
A noncustodial parent, even though current in making child support payments, should be liable to a third party provider of necessaries. The commonlaw doctrine, as explained above, provides adequate safeguards against excessive
liability. Although the definition of necessaries requires further refinement, the
court has properly protected an interest more important than that of the noncustodial parent-the interest of the child.
B.
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80. Karminski v. Karminski, 260 A.D. 491, 493-94, 23 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (1940).
81. One commentator has noted:
Necessaries are usually defined as those articles or services reasonably appropriate for the
support of wife and child, bearing in mind both their needs and the husband's means....
This includes not only food, clothing, and shelter, but such things as medical and dental
care, legal services where needed, furniture and household goods, the wife's funeral serv-

ices, and if the husband is rich, perhaps even a mink coat.... Whether a given article is a
necessary is generally a question of fact for the jury.
H. CLARK, supra note 2, § 6.3, at 190 (footnotes omitted).
82. See, e.g., Watkins v. Medical & Dental Fin. Bureau, 101 Ariz. 580, 582, 422 P.2d 696, 698
(1967) (en bane) ("The 'implied promise for necessaries' doctrine was not formulated for the purpose
of aiding enterprising third parties, but rather is a policy law meant to impel neglectful parents to
assume responsibility for their children's welfare.").

